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Effective contracting for high operational performance in projects  
Abstract 
Purpose – This study examines combinations of contract clauses in order to ascertain 
which combinations correlate to high operational performance.  
Design/methodology/approach – Two hypotheses were formulated from 
contracting theory and tested on data collected from 45 projects. Fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis was used and validated with multiple regression and 
simulation.  
Findings – The hypotheses were tested to determine whether combinations of 
classical, relational and/or associational contract clauses correlate to high operational 
performance. The results show that, whereas high operational performance correlates 
to combinations of relational and associational contract clauses, classical and 
relational clauses should not be combined.  
Originality/value – This study contributes to the theory of contractual 
incompleteness and complementarity, specifically in the context of project 
contracting. The analysis produced two theoretical implications: first, that better 
performing contracts are created when combining relational and associational 
contract clauses, and; second, that, in projects, relational and classical contract clauses 
are not complementary with regards to realising high operational performance.  
Practical implications – The managerial implications of the findings include a more 
thorough understanding of the use of contract clauses and of which clauses 
managers should combine to achieve high operational performance.   
Research limitations/implications – Directions are proposed to guide future 
research in order to produce a more nuanced testing of contractual complementarity. 
Keywords – Classical and relational contracts, contract clauses, operational 
performance, projects  
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1. Introduction 
The motivation underpinning the theory of incomplete contracts (Hart 1995; Hart and 
Moore 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1986) is to understand the limitations of the 
contracts that fail because of bounded rationality in predicting opportunism in future 
contingencies, moral hazards, contract writing, enforcing, and monitoring costs. The 
relevant literature mainly focuses upon two widely adopted types of contracts -
namely, classical and relational. While classical contracts establish the rules for 
discrete and simple, one-off transactions or exchanges, and are often used as tools 
for dealing with transactions at arm’s length; relational contracts approach the matter 
not merely as one-off transactions, but also as relationships so they use clauses with 
extra-contractual relationship means (Kimel, 2007: 235-6). The extant literature and 
practice alike argue that both classical and relational contracts are incomplete 
(Howard et al., 2018; Grandori, 2010; Williamson, 1999).   
To resolve the issue of incompleteness, some studies have explored whether the 
two types of contracts could be combined (e.g. Sumo et al., 2016; Wacker et al., 2016; 
Hartmann et al., 2014; Kalkancı et al., 2014; Smith and King, 2009). However, these 
studies have not explored the combinations of contract clauses. Rather, some studies 
tried to explore how classical contracts can be combined with extra-contractual 
relational mechanisms such as trust, authority, or norms (Maylor and Turner, 2017; 
Caldwell and Howard, 2014; Lumineau and Malhotra, 2011; Weber and Mayer, 2011; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002), but they have not specified how relational and classical 
contract clauses can be combined. In response, other studies have put forward new 
types of contracts called “associational”, designed to help contracting parties to react 
to uncertainties (e.g. Grandori and Furlotti, 2006). To our knowledge, the issue of 
contract clauses combination remains unanswered because no study has hitherto 
tested combinations of contract clauses (as emphasized by, for instance, Howard et al., 
2018; Hartmann et al., 2014; March et al., 2000). In other words, research needs to test 
the combinations of contracts, which amounts to testing the combinations of clauses.  
Contracts providing legal governance for projects are often formulated in 
environments involving highly complex relationships; environments in which time and 
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cost pressures do not allow relational mechanisms to evolve (Broekhuis and Scholten, 
2018; Curlee and Gordon, 2011; Oltra et al., 2005). Thus, contract incompleteness and 
complementarity need to be investigated in project contracts in other ways (Howard 
et al., 2018; Sumo et al., 2016; Kalkancı et al., 2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014).  
Accordingly, the following research question was posed: What combination (or 
combinations) of contract clauses can lead to high operational performance in projects? 
Our approach involved the derivation of hypotheses focusing on combinations of 
contract clauses and then, the testing of each of these in relation to whether they 
could bring about high operational performance (OP). This type of analysis 
constitutes more than a technical study and more than just an example of the 
application of current theory. The theoretical and practical contributions of this work 
are important for those who theorize and handle inter-organizational relationships in 
complex and uncertain supply chains (MacCormack and Mishra, 2015), and in high-
risk, high-variety operations such as projects (Davies and Brady, 2000).  
The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 45 case studies using fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) validated through multiple regression and 
simulation. This study offers the following theoretical contributions. First, findings 
show that high OP in projects is achieved by combinations of relational and 
associational contract clauses. Second, that classical and relational clauses should not 
be combined. The results contribute to the theory of contractual incompleteness and 
complementarity, specifically in projects.  
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. First, the review section 
provides an overview of the main issues in contractual incompleteness and 
complementarity and of the types of contract clauses linked to performance, the 
constructs and the hypotheses. The method section provides justification for the 
suitability of configuration analysis to the context and subject of the study, and a 
detailed protocol of the data collection and analysis involved. Finally, our findings are 
presented and the theoretical and managerial implications as further research 
opportunities are discussed.  
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2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
In the first part of this section, the issues pertaining to incompleteness and 
complementarity in contracting are explained. In the second part, the literature on 
contract clauses is reviewed, the constructs are developed, and the hypotheses are 
derived. 
 
2.1 Contractual incompleteness and complementarity  
Since the late 1980s, there has been a considerable increase in studies addressing 
incompleteness in contract theory (Hart and Moore, 1990; Grossman and Hart, 1986;). 
The literature started exploring incompleteness from the following ideas, drawn from 
transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985), that insufficient contractual 
safeguards can result in inefficient levels of investment; that trading partners fear 
opportunistic behaviors; and that the avoidance of inefficiencies and opportunism 
provide the boundaries of action. Contracts may exhibit two forms of incompleteness: 
discretion, meaning that they do not specify the parties' behaviors in sufficient detail; 
and rigidity, meaning that the parties' obligations are not sufficiently correlated to the 
external states or contingencies (Battigalli and Maggi, 2002). In the theory of 
incomplete contracts, the main concern is to investigate the limitations of those 
contracts that fail to specify contingencies and to set up safeguards guiding action 
involved in the transaction (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009; Hart 1995). The reason for such 
failures can be due to bounded rationality and incomplete information making it 
impossible to anticipate contingencies, therefore leading to difficulties in clarifying 
the appropriate actions to be taken by each contracting party. This often results in the 
wrong course of action being prescribed in the clauses and rising complexities in 
contract structures, with unnecessary clauses and increased writing, monitoring, and 
enforcing costs (MacLeod, 2000).  
In contrast to TCE, which seek to match contract structures to the characteristics 
of transactions, relational contract theory (RCT) espouses extra-contractual relational 
mechanisms (such as trust, authority, or norms) as being more efficient in 
constraining opportunism, while offering more flexibility and lowering set-up costs 
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(MacNeil and Campbell, 2001; MacNeil, 1999). The logic behind relational contracting 
is that the existence of non-legal or social sanctions forces partners to fulfill their 
commitments (Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). In this way contractual incompleteness, 
transaction hazards, and opportunistic behavior can be controlled, which implies that 
relational contracting has complementary effects to classical contracts (Lumineau and 
Malhotra, 2011; Weber and Mayer, 2011; Susarla et al. 2009; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002). However, RCT assumes the existence of a prior relationship between partners. 
This may be the case in inter-organizational supply chain environments in which 
partners have the time and make conscious investments to develop such relationships 
(Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002). The extant literature considers this a ‘weak’ point of 
relational contracting, as the suitability of this assumption may not be verifiable in 
contexts in which temporary organizations have strict time and resource constraints 
and function on swift trust (Curlee and Gordon, 2011; Oltra et al., 2005; Davies and 
Brady, 2000). In terms of incompleteness, relational contracts can be less legally 
binding, because they contain more and weaker clauses that are neither enforceable 
nor observable by third parties (Furlotti, 2007; Klein-Woolthuis et al., 2005). This lack 
of specificity in relational clauses may also cause ambiguity and leave space for 
opportunistic behaviors (Luo, 2002). Thus, the safeguarding function of a relational 
contract may be less effective.  
In summary, both the classical and relational forms of contracting are found to 
be incomplete and more likely to be ineffective and highly complex, thus constraining 
operational flexibility whilst also leading to disputes and to trust deterioration (Faems 
et al., 2008). Due to the incompleteness of both classical and relational contracting 
and to the polarities that exist between them, they have been seen as potentially 
having complementary effects. Many studies have called for the discovery of ways to 
combine them to achieve better performance (e.g. Howard et al., 2018; Sumo et al., 
2016; Kalkancı et al., 2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014).  
The technical definition of complementarity (Ennen and Richter, 2010: 208-9; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1995: 181), states that “doing more of one element encourages 
the increase of another”; conversely, Poppo and Zenger (2002: 713) proposed that “the 
combination of the two should generate higher performance than either [governance 
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mechanism] in isolation”. Based on this definition, studies investigated if classical 
contracts could make transactions efficient when combined with extra-contractual 
relational mechanisms such as trust (Mayer and Teece, 2008; Williamson, 1985). 
However, these studies did not test classical contract clauses with relational or other 
types of contract clauses. Therefore, although extant theory suggests that the 
combination of classical and relational contracts can reduce incompleteness, the 
grounds for testing this argument through an empirical model have not been laid.  
 
2.2 Combining contract types  
There are three contract types in the literature: classical, relational, and associational 
(Appendix 1). The differences between them are found in the focus of their regulation, 
which is, respectively, either the transaction process (classical and relational), or the 
decision-making process (associational). The contract structures are also different 
(Appendix 1): classical contracts are segmented according to the parts of the 
transaction process; relational contracts according to the relationships’ life cycles. 
associational contracts are based upon the “core” of the decision and resource rights 
and the “belt” sections of a mix of contingency clauses (Grandori, 2010: 153, 359; 
Grandori and Furlotti, 2009: 85-86; Kimel, 2007: 236).   
Although several issues have been raised in the literature regarding the 
combination of contracts, the main ones are diversity and uncertainty within the 
transaction. The extant theory holds that the complementary use of contracts may 
differ due to these transactional characteristics (Mallewigt et al., 2012; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Uzzi, 1997). Contingency factors influence transactions and often lead 
to more customized versions of a contract type (Ng and Nudurupati, 2010). This 
customization is based on the premise that the terms of an agreement can be 
presented in varied ways (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) - from informal promises to 
formalized detailed clauses - to fit practice (Schepker et al., 2014). This issue is 
relevant to this study because projects are distinctively characterized by high levels of 
risk, difficulty in establishing relational mechanisms, and high levels of change and 
contingency (Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002). When uncertainty is high and relationship 
lifecycles are short, contracts can become complex and detailed. Therefore, project 
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contracts often inhibit the flexibility that is required by projects more than by other 
operational forms. Any extra-contractual mechanisms are weak because of the short 
project relationship lifecycles, so combining contract clauses is the only way to test 
complementarity (Mellewigt, et al., 2012). In the next section, we review the clauses 
and discuss their combination.  
 
2.3 Combining contract clauses  
Contract clauses are specific provisions that clearly define the duties, rights, and 
privileges possessed by each partner under the contract terms. Each clause also 
addresses a specific aspect (such as quality, delivery time, and/or specifications) 
related to the transaction and may address a procedure and its standards. In order to 
develop a hypothetical model suited to test the idea of combining classical and 
relational contract clauses, the clauses used in the aforementioned three contract 
types need to be reviewed (section 2.4) to derive hypotheses stating how such clauses 
could complement each other to drive high OP. This was done by reviewing those 
studies that had identified and categorized the clauses (see Table 1) found in classical, 
relational, and associational contracts.  
<Please insert Table 1 here> 
Contract clauses can be assessed by reading the contract document that 
formalizes the regulations, processes, and policies that guide the relationship. 
Different clauses serve different purposes and hence can be classified in different 
ways. Some studies have investigated the contract clauses that are prevalent in a 
specific industry (Lui and Ngo 2004). They focused on price, cost, or performance 
(Essig et al., 2016; Caldwell and Howard, 2014). Other studies have created sets of 
contract clauses according to their specific functions and to the perspective from 
which they originate. For instance, Mellewigt et al. (2012) classified clauses found in 
alliance contracts, calling them safeguarding, coordination, and contingency-
adaptability. Luo (2002) classified a task-specificity set, clarifying the partners’ roles 
and responsibilities, and a contingency-adaptability set, specifying action plans for 
the handling of unanticipated contingencies. Some studies have split individual sets 
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into various sub-sets for more nuanced contractual functions (e g. Reuer and Ariño, 
2007). Others have compared sub-sets of contract clauses and measured them in 
isolation to one another (e.g. the 24 clauses pertaining to four contractual functions 
measured independently in Anderson and Dekker, 2005; the three sub-sets-namely, 
contract detail, monitoring, and penalties in Ryall and Sampson, 2009; and the task 
description and contingency planning clauses in Argyres et al., 2007). Grouping 
contract clauses into sets is an accepted way of categorizing them, which also helps in 
operationalizing their large numbers.  
The extant contracting literature offers very limited insights into the relationship 
between contract clauses and performance (Stevenson and Spring, 2007). This 
connects to the question of whether different clauses instigate different trade‐offs in 
performance (MacCormack and Mishra, 2015). For instance, certain clauses may 
prioritize cost over time or scope. These trade-offs are at the center of the discourse 
about ‘performance in contract designs’ (Kalkancı et al., 2014) and reveal the major 
dilemmas inherent to how contracts support high OP (MacCormack and Mishra, 2015). 
There is also the view that partners negotiate and align performance expectations 
within the process of contracting (Selviaridis and Spring, 2018) and the contract then 
represents the negotiated mutual expectations. According to Cannon et al. (2000), the 
relational part of the agreement reflects the expectations both partners have of each 
other, which develop as they work together to define mutual goals. This has particular 
importance for the clauses that establish performance, because they are co-
constructed with key stakeholders based on these expectations (Batista et al., 2017). 
Still, their benefits realization in project contracts remains a major under-explored 
area (Zwikael and Meredith, 2018).  
Based on the review of the studies, we summarize in Table 1 the three distinct 
sets of contract clauses, which are discussed in more detail in the next section in order 
to develop the constructs for testing the hypotheses.  
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2.4 Hypotheses development  
In the following sections we define the independent variables which are three key sets 
of contract clauses (see Table 1) before positioning the study’s hypotheses.  
 
2.4.1 Classical contract clauses 
The literature on classical contract clauses is the largest of the three. Moreover, a 
large number of clauses exists as an outcome of the risk-averse approach of classical 
contracting, which produces very detailed, situation specific clauses; this increases 
their number, as several probabilities need to be covered in any situation (Williamson, 
1999). Several articles have grouped clauses into sets according to their roles in the 
transactions. There are four groups of classical clauses (Table 1): (i) action-based 
clauses-accountability, monitoring, evaluation, and performance standards (time, cost 
and scope); (ii) property rights (asset specificity/IP; financial obligations, 
confidentiality and exclusivity); (iii) transaction controls-payments, prices, rewards, 
penalties, and liabilities; and (iv) end of transaction-dispute resolution and 
termination procedures. 
More specifically, the clauses deal with property rights (e.g. Hagedoorn and 
Hesen, 2007), confidentiality (Reuer and Ariño, 2007), service scope and performance 
guarantees (Susarla et al., 2009), task details, roles, responsibilities and monitoring 
(e.g., reporting), assessment and evaluation (Argyres and Mayer, 2007); unilateral early 
termination (Mayer, 2004), risk allocation, enforcement, and supervision costs, 
penalties for underperformance (Ryall and Sampson, 2009), as well as dispute 
resolution (Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Reuer and Ariño, 2007).  
Prior studies have argued that classical contracts are incomplete (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986). In other words, contract clauses cannot safeguard against opportunism 
and become unnecessarily complex in their effort to do so (Henisz et al. 2012; 
Williamson, 1999). They cannot provide complete information and often feature 
expectation misalignment, as well as a focus on differences, rather than on mutual 
benefits (Zwikael and Meredith, 2018). Moreover, they emphasize penalties as a 
preventative mechanism (Sommer and Loch, 2009) and involve high costs to be 
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reworked and rewritten (Howard et al., 2018; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). Because of 
the complexity reached by their sheer number, classical clauses are not conducive to 
flexibility when problem solving is required in situations of contingency, change, and 
emergence (Vaaland and Håkansson, 2003) and therefore often lead to low 
performance.  
 
2.4 2 Relational contract clauses  
Relational contract clauses are less specific and more general principles and codes of 
conduct that are intended to inspire and guide behaviors (good faith, due diligence, 
non-competition, see Table 1). These clauses act as a kind of relationship blueprint 
(Ryall and Sampson 2009) that facilitates the establishment of norms (Kern and 
Willcocks, 2000). Relational clauses replace their classical counterparts’ risk allocation 
approach with a risk sharing one (Furlotti, 2007), focus on incentives, and play a vital 
role in mitigating concerns and clarifying the partners’ mutual expectations (Puranam 
and Vanneste, 2009). For instance, a clear delineation of the partners’ roles, tasks, and 
responsibilities helps to reduce complexity and to avoid costly misunderstandings 
(Ryall and Sampson, 2009; Argyres et al., 2007). These clauses can further specify 
information procedures, describe the responsibilities of and interactions between 
partners (Susarla et al. 2009), define processes for sharing information, layout external 
constraints and obligations-such as those pertaining to information disclosure and 
interaction with third parties (Reuer and Ariño, 2007), and regulate the roles played by 
boundary-spanners, gatekeepers, or other kinds of mediators between partners 
(Mellewigt et al., 2012). Other relational clauses (see Table 1) include hiring practices 
carried out through non-competing and non-solicitation agreements (Reuer and 
Ariño, 2007), or the designation of specific persons as dedicated alliance managers 
(Ryall and Sampson, 2009). Finally, they also include rules for conflict resolution 
(negotiation, type of mediation, and arbitration). 
Prior studies have argued that relational contract clauses are often vague and 
low in specificity (Sumo et al., 2016). Examples are revision clauses, the doctrine of 
excuse or dispute resolution and arbitration procedures (Scott, 2013). Relational 
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clauses do not make many provisions for enforcement or penalties as they depend on 
non-legally enforceable extra-contractual mechanisms (such as informal adjustments, 
trust, authority or norms) for the clauses to be enforced (Maylor and Turner, 2017; 
Furlotti, 2007; Williamson, 1999). Similarly to classical contracts, relational contracts 
may in practice become highly complex (Remington, 2011), thus leading to issues of 
contract complexity while still enabling partners to act opportunistically (Brandon-
Jones and Carey, 2011).  
In summary, classical and relational contract clauses have a different focus 
concerning how transactions should be regulated. Taking into consideration the 
argument pertaining to their complementarity discussed in sections 2.1-2.3, the 
following hypothesis is positioned:  
 
H1: Combinations of classical and relational contract clauses are positively 
correlated to high operational performance. 
 
2.4.3 Associational contract clauses  
Extant studies have addressed an additional set of contract clauses that may help to 
deal with the incompleteness inherent in classical and relational contracts. Following 
Grandori and Furlotti (2006: 7, 11), these contract clauses, which are labeled 
‘associational’, are useful for the design of less complex and more flexible contracts. 
They are high-order, content-free, framing clauses that create a core that functions as 
a constitution (general statement). The core governs the process of adjusting the 
terms of transactions over time (Grandori, 2010: 359; Grandori and Furlotti, 2009: 86). 
An associational contract uses this ‘core of associational clauses’ and then adds a 
‘belt’ of supplementary ones. While the core functions as a constitution - a general 
direction for the allocation of decision-making rights and for the commitment (lock-
in) of resources - the belt contains clauses, which may be either classical or relational 
or both, that are suitable to the situation and to the business relationship (Grandori 
and Furlotti, 2009: 96). 
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Grandori (2010: 357) suggested what should be the “core” of resource lock-in 
clauses: (i) a specification of which resources should be pooled; (ii) a specification of 
which actors should provide them; (iii) a specification of which rights over resources 
are pooled and which are not - in particular: who owns the committed assets, 
according to what procedures actions and projects are to be selected, and how the 
rights to residual rewards are to be distributed; and (iv) by which mechanisms 
resources should be locked-in while providing exit rights and modes (as distinct from 
the resources committed). Examples of ‘core’ constitutional provisions are: how 
decision rights are to be allocated; which procedures are to be followed in decision-
making joint-steering committees and their limits and liabilities; and what boundaries 
are set to limit autonomous actions (Grandori and Furlotti, 2009, 2006) (see Table 1). 
Associational clauses support democratic, multi-party decision-making systems (such 
as work cooperatives). They focus on defining the boundaries of the association 
between the partners in times of contingency, without creating extra safeguarding or 
relational rules. Mellewigt et al. (2012) wrote that these clauses are of “the 
contingency-adaptability type”, which deals with force majeure (Hagedoorn and 
Hesen, 2007; Luo, 2002), price adjustment, or change procedures (Mayer and 
Bercovitz, 2008).  
Until now, these clauses have been the subject of few studies; however, they are 
attracting increasing attention because modern partnerships are becoming more 
unstable and contingent on dynamically changing environments. Mellewigt et al. 
(2012) noted that associational clauses have an effect on relational ones when 
combined. Similarly, Luo (2002) stated that associational clauses might even combine 
with others as an outcome of learning (Argyres et al., 2007). These arguments lead to 
the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Combinations of associational and relational contract clauses are 
positively correlated to high operational performance. 
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3. Method 
3.1 Multiple methods for cross-validation 
A combination of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), regression analysis, and 
simulation was used to cross-validate the findings. Given the novelty of testing 
combinations of independent variables based on cases, this study needed a research 
design that was positioned ‘mid-way’ between a purely deductive variable-oriented 
one and a purely inductive case-based one (Fiss, 2011). Fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) was best suited for this type of research as it integrates 
the strengths of the variable and case-based approaches (Ragin, 2008), thus enabling 
the exploration of causal configurations in empirical cases.  
FsQCA was deployed for the main analysis for three reasons. First, because it 
examines how different combinations of causal factors (independent variables) 
correlate with the outcome (in this case, operational performance). While regression 
analysis can isolate the effect of individual factors, fsQCA captures equifinality, which 
enables the testing of all combinations associated with the outcome (Blackman et al., 
2011). Second, because, whilst methods such as cluster analysis and deviation scores 
can detect distinct sets of clauses, they do not explain how these work together (Fiss, 
2011). In contrast, fsQCA retains sensitivity to the nature of the relations between 
variables (i.e. complementarity and substitution) (Byrne and Ragin, 2009). Third, 
because fsQCA provides reliable results for small-to-medium sized samples (10–50 
cases) (Misangyi et al., 2017; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).  
In addition, fuzzy set analysis suits the study’s context and data in two ways. First, 
unlike in crisp sets, the membership of a variable in a set can be expressed in degrees, 
which is especially useful for our hypotheses and data. This is because the question of 
what constitutes a ‘combination of clauses’ and ‘effect on performance’ does not have 
a yes or no answer. The theoretical direction is that most contracts use a variety of 
clauses in different proportions; thus, binary scores of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in relation to the 
presence of clauses and of their effects on the outcome will not reveal much. To test 
our hypotheses in a meaningful way, the independent variables’ degrees of set-
membership and of effect on outcome needed to be scored. In addition, the data 
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came from contracts and interviews and thus constituted an archive of social data 
that required nuanced measurement in degrees. Second, fuzzy-set analysis enables 
the accurate testing of explicit hypotheses, while the crisp-set form is more attuned to 
exploratory analysis through more general and vague propositions. The fsQCA 
method restricts the analysis of necessity to the essential deductive testing of 
previously defined factors or theoretically disjunctions (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2010). This enables the testing of predefined expectations on necessary variables or 
disjunctions of variables.  
In brief, the fsQCA approach matched the nature of the research question, the 
data, and the context. However, because the sample was medium-sized, assessments 
were needed to ensure reliability and to double-check the correlations. This is why 
multiple regression and simulation were used to check the robustness of the fsQCA 
analyses and to ensure a sufficient grasp of the details at the root level (Rohlfing, 
2016). Specifically, multiple regression, fsQCA, and simulation were used in a 
complementary fashion - which was made possible by these methods’ different 
(linear/set-case based) assumptions (Misangyi et al., 2017) - in a mixed-method 
research design (Rohlfing, 2016). In addition, imperfect case knowledge made 
simulation appropriate for the evaluation of fsQCA as, in such situations, simulation 
provides a general and balanced picture of the sensitivity of fsQCA to modeling 
decisions or to data-related features (Rohlfing, 2016; Marx and Dusa, 2011). In 
addition, simulation has been used before to assess whether or not a configuration is 
significant (Skaaning, 2011). To summarize, the benefit of combining fsQCA with 
multiple regression and simulation is that it provides a holistic picture of the validity 
of QCA results through cross-validation (Fiss, 2011), and enables the detection of 
potential difficulties or inefficiencies linked to sample size and correlational 
inferences. 
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3.2 Data collection  
FsQCA is optimally positioned to compare variables from multiple cases that share 
characteristics while also presenting a few background differences (Rihoux and Ragin, 
2009: 24-25). Hence, the projects selected for our sample had to have the following 
similarities: (i) they needed to be large scale projects with multiple and diverse 
partners; (ii) the project partnerships had to be between one buyer/sponsor and 
multiple suppliers/contractors; (iii) they had to be controlled by a national or 
supranational public-sector buyer or sponsor; (iv) they had to feature similarly high 
levels of dependency of the contractors upon the buyer/sponsor; and (v) the 
contractors had to be subject to tendering, selection, and monitoring control 
procedures and legislation. 
Based on the similarity criteria, 45 multi-partner projects were selected: (i) two UK 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects; (ii) three European Public Health projects 
(EARSS); (iii) 14 ICT/eTen Health Framework projects; and (iv) 26 international 
healthcare projects offering healthcare relief in disaster conditions (e.g. earthquakes 
and floods). 
Overall, 98 semi-structured interviews were conducted involving a common set 
of questions with senior managers, professional sub-contractors (e.g., medical, 
technical) and key suppliers (for background details please see Appendix 2 and 3). 
The timing of the interviews varied from 45 minutes to four hours, depending on the 
number of people interviewed and on the level of detail of the information provided 
by each interviewee. The number of interviews per project varied according to the 
number of partners involved in each partnership (for instance, PPP projects had 
dozens of partners, and hence more interviews were required). Each investigated 
project involved public and private partners. The interviewees were chosen through 
purposive sampling: the key individuals interviewed had been involved in writing and 
operationalizing the contracts, held managerial positions within the projects and had 
knowledge of the outcomes. To gain a holistic perspective, efforts were made to 
ensure consistency in interviewing all key parties in each contract. The interviewers 
followed a semi-structured interview guide and most interviews were conducted 
between a single interviewer and a single interviewee. In a few cases, two interviewers 
16 
 
were present. Projects are usually assessed in terms of cost, time, and scope, and the 
interviewed managers were all well trained in and familiar with this type of 
assessment and were able to talk about performance. The interviewees understood 
and described the contract parts and processes and the types of clauses. They did not 
have any objections in relation to the types of contract clauses and to the types of 
agreements (further information is provided in Appendix 3). The semi-structured 
interview data were also triangulated with secondary data (e.g. independent reports 
about the projects) to ensure that objective OP measurements were obtained.  
 
3.3 Measures, coding and checking for heterogeneity 
Fuzzy sets allow for degrees of membership of categories. They record a value of 1 for 
full membership of a set, zero for total non-membership, and a fuzzy score ranging 
between the two extremes for any intermediate degree of membership - the point of 
maximum ambiguity. A fuzzy score of 0.75 might mean, for example, that an element 
is ‘mostly in’ the set. Fuzzy scores were used (Table 2) to assign a value to each set of 
clauses in each contract. According to these scores, full membership (1) means that all 
of the clauses of a particular type were present in the contract. Coincidence with non-
membership (0) of another type would have meant that this case was a purely 
relational or purely classical contract (which did not happen in this study). Below are 
the membership measures for the independent and dependent variables. 
<Please insert Table 2 here> 
 
3.3.1 Measuring the clauses 
The constructs for the independent variables are based on the sets of clauses in Table 
1. There are three sets of clauses — classical, relational and associational. A four fuzzy 
score–scale (Ragin, 2008: 31, see Table 2 upper box) was chosen to measure each set 
of clauses by scoring the frequency of their use in the contracts—as taken from the 
contract templates. The fuzzy scale had values that ranged from full membership to 
non-membership: most frequent (1 = full membership); mostly frequent (0.67 = 
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mostly in); the crossover point (0.50 = ambiguous membership); less frequent (0.33 = 
mostly out), and non-frequent (0 = full non-membership) (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; 
Ragin, 2008).   
 
3.3.2 Measuring the outcome (operational performance) 
The dependent variable for OP consists of the Iron Triangle construct, which consists 
of three performance measures (time, cost, and scope). This has been widely adopted 
and used to measure project performance both in academic studies and in practice 
across different project industries (e.g. construction, engineering, healthcare, and 
information technology) (Ika, 2009). These three performance measures are 
consistently present in different types of project contracts (Serrador and Turner, 
2015). To preserve consistency in measurement, OP was therefore assessed in terms 
of time, cost, and scope. Time-based indicators were used, including deliveries on 
project completion time, timely communication, and coordination, cost-based 
indicators such as operations, purchase, financial, and transportation costs, and 
scope-based indicators in the form of satisfaction of project aims and of stakeholder 
expectations. The OP of each project was evaluated in terms of the average of these 
three indicators measured on a three-value fuzzy scale (Ragin, 2008: 31; Table 2), 
based on the data pertaining to performance collected via interviews and secondary 
data.  
The values on the fuzzy scale chosen to measure OP were as follows (Table 2, 
lower box): (i) Highly successful with little or no problems, change or renegotiations 
(1= full membership). In other words, the contracts were sufficient and there were no 
changes in terms of cost, time, or scope; (ii) A vague situation with several problems 
and some renegotiations in relation to any of the three performance criteria, which, 
however, did not lead to complete rewrite or collapse (0.50 = ambiguous 
membership).; (iii) Low performance or not successful, referring to situations in which 
parts of the contract had not been fulfilled (0 = full non-membership) (Rihoux and 
Ragin, 2009; Ragin, 2008).   
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3.3.3 Coding  
The following steps were followed to code the data according to the measures 
described in the previous section:  
1. Each contract was examined and the numbers of clauses in each set used in it 
were scored (based on the sets in Table 1].   
2. Fuzzy scores were used (Table 2) to assign a value to each set of clauses in 
each contract. We also ensured inter-coder reliability. The inter-coder reliability 
analyses were conducted for the underlying items and the alpha values ranged from 
0.96 to 0.98, demonstrating a high degree of agreement between coders (Compton et 
al., 2012). 
3. The interview answers pertaining to the clauses and OP of each project were 
analyzed. Fuzzy scores were used to assign a value for OP to each project.  
4. All the scores were recorded in a project coding Table that was then analyzed.  
After the scores from the interviews had been collected, the raw values for each 
variable were coded according to the fuzzy-scale (Table 2). Any interview input that 
referred to performance in terms of time, cost, and scope in the transcripts was 
underlined with a score, according to the fuzzy-scale, and coded in the project coding 
Table as a raw value. The process was standardized (a few examples were initially 
jointly coded) so that there would be no disagreement about the scores when they 
were crosschecked independently. After the scores from the contract templates were 
collected, the raw values were coded for each variable in the project coding Table.  
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3.3.4 Heterogeneity and checks 
As shown in Table 3, no significant heterogeneity was found between the cases. A 
mean difference test was conducted to check whether there were any differences in 
the variable mean values; disaster relief projects (N = 26) versus other category of 
projects (N = 19). The relative mean (x) and standard deviation (σ) values were not 
very different, and this was supported by our t-test, which showed no significant 
differences (p < 0.05) in any of the variables used in further analyses to test the 
hypotheses. Additionally, a chi-square difference test was conducted in order to check 
whether the groups were different; they were not significantly so, with the chi-square 
difference being 1.99 and 3 degrees of freedom. Regarding path levels, both groups 
produced significant path coefficients. The path coefficients for disaster relief-based 
projects were β = - 0.46, β = 0.27, and β = 0.30 for classical, relational, and association 
clauses respectively. In a similar sequence for three clauses, the path coefficients for 
the other group were β = - 0.52, β = 0.31, and β = 0.30. The relative coefficients were 
more or less similar and consequently supported the chi-square test results. Also, the 
control variables such as the number of partners, years of contracting, value, and 
number of partners interviewed were insignificant. 
<Please insert Table 3 here> 
 
3.4 The analysis procedure  
The fsQCA analysis procedure, based on that developed by Ragin (1987), is shown in 
Figure 1 at the end of this section. First, the models that would be tested for each 
hypothesis were decided upon. Then, the cases that shared the appropriate 
characteristics were selected and the data collection protocol was built (see interview 
Table in Appendix 2). Finally, after coding the variables (as above), consistency and 
calibration thresholds were chosen for each variable according to the indirect cluster 
method (Thiem and Dusa, 2012: 54-58).  
This calibration method was chosen because it enables the thresholds to be 
decided based on the clustering of the values of each variable by means of a 
procedure first introduced by Ragin (2008). The indirect method assumes a vector of 
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thresholds that cuts the original data into equal intervals and then the application of a 
(quasi)binomial logistic regression with a fractional polynomial equation. This method 
gives calibration values that are more representative of the trends within the data, 
rather than directly setting a ‘most likely’ calibration threshold. Before the analysis 
could be undertaken, the calibrated Table had to be confirmed with regression and 
simulation tests. With proper values verified, the next step was to test these values in 
two ways: first for necessary and then for sufficient combinations, with a minimum 
consistency of 0.75 and inclusion of 0.60 (the values suggested for reliable results by 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).  
FsQCA uses two types of tools for testing hypotheses—necessity and 
sufficiency—that are conceptualized in set-theoretic terms. Whenever a causal factor 
is necessary (but not sufficient) for an outcome, the instances of the outcome form a 
subset of those of the causal factor. A necessary factor is a cause that must be present 
for the outcome to occur all or most of the time. Although its presence does not 
mean that the outcome will occur, its absence means that the outcome will not occur 
all or most of the time. A sufficient factor is one which, when present, ensures that the 
outcome will occur all or most of the time. Whenever a casual condition is sufficient 
(but not necessary) to an outcome, the instances of the causal condition form a 
subset of those of the outcome. Like necessary factors, sufficient ones are not 
absolute.  
There are two measures suited to assess the goodness-of-fit of both necessary 
and sufficient tests-consistency and coverage-which are measured on a range from 
0.0-1.0. Consistency measures the strength of the test. A score of 1.0 indicates that, 
whenever the outcome is present, the necessary variable is too. Scores of less than 1.0 
indicate a corresponding degree of inconsistency. For example, a score of 0.95 would 
show that whenever the outcome is present, the factor is "almost always" present. A 
generally accepted rule-of-thumb is that necessity and sufficiency are indicated when 
consistency is equal to or greater than 0.75, but not otherwise. 
A coverage score of 1.0 indicates that whenever the necessary variable is present, 
the outcome is present. Coverage scores are an indication of the empirical relevance 
of a configuration of variables to the cases; this, in turn, can be understood as being 
21 
 
an indicator of its importance. Regarding the coverage of configurations, the lower its 
score, the less empirically relevant a causal configuration is. That means, it is able to 
explain fewer cases in which the outcome occurred. The generally accepted rule-of-
thumb is that coverage score should not be lower than 0.5 (Ragin, 2008).  
The necessity tests were performed first, followed by the sufficiency ones. When 
testing for sufficiency, a truth table is constructed to show the scores of all possible 
combinations plus single variables. The truth table has 2n rows, where n equals the 
number of independent variables. As there were three independent variables, the 
truth table had 8 tests. Each observation from the dataset was sorted into one row in 
the truth table, based on its membership scores. A truth table provides a typology, 
grouping similar observations together, and the rows of the truth table are called 
configurations. 
A truth table goes through a procedure, called minimization, for which there are 
three outcomes: ‘complex solution’, ‘intermediate solution’, and ‘parsimonious 
solution’ (Ragin, 2008). These represent different levels of simplification ranging from 
most conservative (complex) to most aggressive (parsimonious). Parsimonious 
expressions retain all complexity in data; they are simply those rows of the truth table 
where the outcome equals 1, including configurations that are not linked to 
observations. Complex solutions, on the other hand, remove all the outcomes that are 
ambiguous. Parsimonious solutions are often overly simplistic, but can provide the 
lowest level of causal complexity generated by reanalyzing the truth table with the set 
of ‘remainder’ rows (combinations lacking good instances). Ragin and Sonnett (2005) 
stated that ‘complex’ (or detailed) solutions eliminate all logical remainders, which are 
“combinations of causal factors that lack empirical instances” (Ragin, 2008: 155). 
Intermediate solutions are based on carefully justified counterfactual arguments 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; Ragin, 2008). All three tests were conducted and 
then all three solutions were observed to evaluate the outcome. In this case, the 
results were then validated by means of multiple regression and simulation tests.  
<Please insert Figure 1 here> 
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4. Results 
4. 1 Descriptive statistics and quality checks 
First, the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix produced for the sets of clauses 
are presented in Table 4. The calibrations produced mean values for the clauses 
ranging from 0.36 to 0.61, thus showing good close ranges that may result in 
significant associations. The matrix provides an indication of the significant correlation 
that exists between clauses and high OP, with all values being significant at p < 0.01. 
Specifically, relational and associational clauses are strongly positively correlated both 
with OP and with each other, whilst classical clauses show inverse relations with all the 
other variables. 
<Please insert Table 4 here> 
 
4.2 The fsQCA results and hypotheses validation 
The necessity tests are shown in Table 5. Hypothesis 1 posits that classical and 
relational clauses combine in complementary ways to realize high OP. This hypothesis 
is not supported, as models 1, 4, 5, and 7 show that classical clauses are not 
complementary to relational ones, but that associational clauses appear to take their 
place instead. Hypothesis 2 speculates that relational and associational clauses are 
positively related to high OP and, consequently, that they may combine in 
complementary ways (i.e. moderating) to realize high OP. This hypothesis is 
addressed in two parts. First, whether both clauses are positively related to high OP. 
Models 2 and 3 support the former statement, and models 6 and 7 support the latter. 
Second, as can be seen in Table 5 (i.e. sufficiency results and models), Hypothesis 1 is 
again not supported, whilst hypothesis 2 is corroborated. Three solutions (complex, 
intermediate and parsimonious) that provide proof against our hypotheses are 
presented. These represent combinations that are sufficient for the outcome to occur, 
each being based on different assumptions and each presenting specific 
differentiating characteristics as follows. The complex solution is the most 
conservative, as it does not allow for logical remainders and assumptions to be 
included. The intermediate solution incorporates only ‘easy’ counterfactuals, and is 
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the simplest to interpret. The parsimonious solution allows all counterfactuals, both 
‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ ones. The reason why all three solutions are used here is that they 
can corroborate or falsify each other, as suggested by Ragin (2008). The complex 
solution shows a prominent combination (~classical * RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL) 
that also corroborates the result found in the necessity test. Classical and relational 
clauses substitute one another (take each other’s place), whilst relational and 
associational clauses combine in complementary ways (RELATIONAL * 
ASSOCIATIONAL). The associational clauses alone (based on the intermediate solution) 
also depict strong evidence of high OP. Moreover, the combinations correlate with 
high OP with a very high level of consistency (> 0.90). 
<Please insert Table 5 here> 
 
4.3 Multiple regression and simulation results for hypotheses cross-validation 
Table 6 provides a summary of the regression results. The final models (i.e. ~classical; 
classical * RELATIONAL, ~classical * RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL) for Hypothesis 1 
(i.e. the combination of classical and relational clauses complementing each other and 
being positively correlated with high OP) and the models (RELATIONAL; 
ASSOCIATIONAL; RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL) for Hypothesis 2 (i.e. the 
combination of associational and relational clauses being positively correlated with 
high OP) were cross-validated through multiple regression and simulation. The 
regression analysis revealed that classical clauses negatively affect high OP, with β = - 
0.50, t-value = - 5.16 and p = 0.000. Relational and associational clauses positively 
affect OP (β = 0.27, t-value = 3.52 and p = 0.001 for relational clauses and β = 0.29, t-
value = 2.81 and p = 0.008 for associational ones; R2 = 82% and adjusted-R2 = 81%). 
The moderation results for Hypothesis 1 are not supported. The interactions of 
~classical * RELATIONAL and ~classical * RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL show 
negative effects, with β = - 0.65, t-value = - 5.90 and p = 0.00; β = - 0.24, t-value = - 
2.10 and p = 0.04 respectively. This enables to conclude that classical clauses do not 
complement or that combinations of classical and relational classes are not positively 
correlated with high OP. 
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Hypothesis 2 posits that combinations of associational clauses with relational 
ones are positively correlated to high OP, and is supported with β = 0.60, t-value = 
8.89 and p < 0.001. Additionally, no multi-collinearity issues were found. The 
collinearity tolerance values were greater than 0.40, which are well above the cut-off 
criterion of 0.20. Specifically, the values for classical, relational and associational 
clauses were 0.46, 0.73 and 0.41, respectively. Moreover, the variance inflation factors 
were 2.16, 1.37 and 2.44, which are substantially lower than the recommended cut-off 
criterion of 10 (Dormann, 2013; O’Brien, 2007).  
<Please insert Table 6 here> 
The simulation analysis with n = 320 produced similar outcomes for the main 
contract clauses: classical (β = - 0.43 and t-value = - 8.55), relational (β = 0.16 and t-
value = 3.070) and associational (β = 0.33 and t-value = 6.50). Similarly, the 
moderation results were corroborated and support Hypothesis 1 (~classical * 
RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL, β = - 0.27 and t-value = - 4.68) and Hypothesis 2 
(RELATIONAL * ASSOCIATIONAL, β = 0.53 and t-value = 9.40). All relationships were 
also found to be significant at p < 0.001. This triangulation with the regression and 
simulation analysis provided a comprehensive testing procedure for the models. 
 
5. Discussion 
Project contracts are often incomplete and have serious performance issues. The 
argument that neither classical nor relational contracts are adequate to realize high 
OP was followed. The argument, drawn from contracting theory (e.g. Sumo et al., 
2016; Wacker et al., 2016; Caldwell and Howard, 2014; Hartmann et al., 2014; Kalkancı 
et al., 2014; Smith and King, 2009), that classical and relational contracts should be 
combined in order to overcome incompleteness and achieve high OP was also 
adopted. This study has elaborated upon the theoretical framework of contractual 
incompleteness by testing combinations of three contract clauses to find which ones 
drive high OP.  
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5.1 Theoretical implications  
This study contributes to the theory of contractual complementarity, specifically in the 
context of project contracting. The analysis produced two theoretical implications: 
first, that relational and classical contract clauses in project contracts are not 
complementary; and second, that more complete project contracts are created when 
combining relational with associational contract clauses that complement each other.  
First theoretical implication - The results have shown that combinations of 
classical and relational contract clauses do not lead to high OP and act as substitutes; 
this may be attributed to the characteristics of projects, which are different from other 
types of operations. In contrast to prior research that investigated incompleteness, 
the results of this study show that project stakeholder and supply chain relationships 
do not share the characteristics found in long-term inter-organizational relationships 
of operations organizations (Curlee and Gordon, 2011; Oltra et al., 2005; Davies and 
Brady, 2000). Specifically, projects are temporary organizational forms that are subject 
to stringent time pressures, to difficulties in establishing relational mechanisms (trust, 
authority, norms), and to high levels of change and contingency. Often, project 
relationships are highly adversarial, and trust between partners needs to be built 
swiftly. Projects are characterized by high operational risks and their timeframes are 
often unstable (Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002).  
Therefore, the findings may be partly explained by the temporary nature of 
project relationships, which often cease when projects finish. Thus, a partner may not 
be more incentivized to share risks as they may not be in a repeating long-term 
business relationship. There is also insufficient time to develop strong norms and 
strong authority patterns, making coordination more difficult. Coordination therefore 
demands that partners retain a high degree of flexibility to handle change. However, 
classical clauses, which are designed to bring stability and control in a transaction, run 
contrary to the need to manage change often. Extant studies that have focused on 
project contracts and partnerships have found that partners who constantly deal with 
changes in project plans are faced with high rates of litigation between contractors, 
and very often fail in achieving cost, time, and/or specification performance targets 
(e.g., Roehrich and Lewis, 2012; Zheng et al., 2008). On the other hand, relational 
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contract clauses are weak because of the lack of extra-contractual mechanisms that 
could reinforce the agreement, as discussed above. It seems that, when these two 
types of contract clauses are combined in project contracts, they do not complement 
each other’s virtues but, rather, enhance each other’s weaknesses, therefore not 
leading to high OP. 
Second theoretical implication - The results show a second theoretical 
contribution - namely, that associational and relational contract clauses have 
complementary effects and are both substitutes to classical contract clauses. 
Relationships in projects are characterized by shorter time-spans, less capacity for 
control, and higher risk; thus, they require higher operational flexibility. Because of 
the above, relationships in projects are often more susceptible to contingencies and 
risk than those found in other types of operations (Gil, 2009; Skaates et al., 2002). 
These higher levels of contingency and risk, in turn, add higher pressure for 
operational flexibility. The results of hypothesis 2 show that associational contract 
clauses provide the flexibility required (Mellewigt et al., 2012), playing a significant 
role in project contracts by supporting relational contract clauses in the development 
of better coordination (Remington, 2011). In order to counteract some of their 
limitations and to realize high OP, relational contract clauses - which are often vague 
and low in specificity (Sumo et al., 2016) - can be combined with associational 
contract clauses. 
In this sense, the combination of relational and associational contract clauses can 
counteract the inefficiencies inherent in relational contracting (Winch, 2010). This 
result shows a possible connection with risk and devolution in contract clauses, which 
links to the capability to adapt decision-making in risky environments. The result is 
that project contracts should adopt associational contract clauses in which a ‘core’ of 
flexible decision processes is complemented by a ‘belt’ of mainly relational contract 
clauses.  
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5.2 Further research  
Whilst this study offers promising findings, it does, however, have t limitations: 
First, it has a single sector focus (the sample projects dealt with several aspects of 
healthcare services), and second, it draws its data from a medium-sized sample. 
Nevertheless, this study’s research design can be replicated in other settings (different 
industries and types of projects) and the results could increase the generalizability of 
and build on its findings. Regarding sample size, QCA is applicable to both 
small/medium and large samples. However, it is important to cross-validate the 
results with other techniques.  
As the emerging body of literature on how contracts and contract clauses can be 
combined grows, the findings present manifold future research opportunities. Further 
research should test the relationship between operational flexibility and the 
combination of associational with relational contract clauses. This line of research 
could investigate how best to address the problem of operational flexibility in 
projects. Flexibility has strong links to risk, uncertainty, and complexity stemming 
from both the project environment and contracts. Future studies need to perform 
multivariate analysis of the complex relationship between contracts, flexibility and 
high OP. 
Also, it is not enough that contracting partners know which contract clauses to 
use. Further studies could investigate the degrees of influence and impact that 
different types of risk and temporality have on the effectiveness and structure of 
project contracts in relation to decision-making (Cannon et al., 2000). This would be a 
test of the moderation effects of risk and complexity on the relationship between 
contracts and high OP. Future work on contracting cannot offer solutions to 
contractual incompleteness unless more nuanced studies test multiple combinations 
of contract clauses. For example, future research efforts may want to investigate 
which combinations of core or belt contract clauses (from Table 1) exhibit the highest 
complementary effects. Finally, future research may also investigate power between 
different contracting partners and how power influences the combination of contract 
clauses and their impact OP.  
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5.3 Managerial implications  
The managerial implications of this study include a more thorough understanding of 
the use of contract clauses. Contracting in projects has been a fundamental, but 
problematic, area for managers and policymakers, who continue to struggle to 
achieve high performance in terms of time, cost, and scope. The findings present 
implications for those project managers who seek to overcome the effects of contract 
incompleteness when governing various project relationships. The development of a 
more complete - or, at least, less ineffective - contract entails the understanding of 
how to customize contract clauses to elicit adaptive reactions in future contingencies.  
Moreover, managers often adopt classical contracts as their preference lies 
towards risk avoidance by means of penalty clauses. With project transactions 
changing over time, managers are required to adopt a more flexible approach to 
solve operational problems. Different combinations of contract clauses can help to 
tackle different operational changes. For instance, when purchasing requirements or 
inventory levels change, the use of associational clauses related to resource 
acquisition could be useful to realize OP. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The study contributes to two research areas: (i) the theory of contractual 
incompleteness and complementarity; and (ii) project contracting. Hypotheses 
pertaining to combinations of classical, relational, and associational contract clauses 
were derived from theory and tested on data collected from 45 projects. The results 
have shown that high operational performance is achieved when relational and 
associational contract clauses are combined. Moreover, classical and relational 
contract clauses are substitutes in project contracts when realizing high OP and, 
hence, should not be combined. The study’s key implication is that theory in 
contractual incompleteness with regards to project contracts should be directed 
towards combinations that include associational contract clauses. This study has 
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increased our understanding of contractual incompleteness and complementarity and 
of how it relates to operational performance in projects.   
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6. Tables & Figure 
 
Table 1: Categories of clauses in each type of contract  
Table 2: Fuzzy scores 
Table 3: Checking the case sample for heterogeneity 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix  
Table 5: QCA analysis, models, and hypotheses results 
Table 6: Regression results  
 
Figure 1: The analysis steps: combining fsQCA and multiple regression/simulation tests  
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Constructs (sets)  
Classical Contracts  Classical Clauses (from theory) Exemplary Sources 
[opportunism driven]  
 
Safeguarding, contro and accountability  
1. accountability – monitoring -evaluation - performance standards 
(time, cost and scope)  
2. obligations, (asset specificity/IP), confidentiality- exclusivity, 
property rights 
3. payments / prices / rewards / penalties / liabilities  
4. dispute resolution - termination procedures 
Mallewigt et al. (2012), Argyres and Mayer, (2007); 
Tiwana (2008); Reuer and Arino (2007); Smith 
(2006); Ferguson et al. (2005); Poppo and Zenger 
(2002); Eggleston et al. (2000); March et al. (2000); 
Speidel (2000); Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) 
Relational Contracts  Relational Clauses (from theory) Exemplary Sources 
[trust driven]  
Extra-contractual mechanisms = building 
trust and commitment, risk sharing, authority 
and norms   
 
1. work division (+ users) – task specificity  
2. information flow / process interaction (+ users)  
3. meetings, boards, panels, conferences, transaction/interaction 
frequency 
4. negotiation processes, arbitration, dependence 
5. alliance clauses, relationship period, expectation of continuity   
Smets et al. (2013); Reuer and Arino (2007);  
Ferguson et al. (2005); Batenburg et al. (2003); 
Poppo and Zenger (2002); Zollo et al. (2002), Luo 
(2002); Uzzi (1997); Grandori and Soda (1995); 
Granovetter (1985)  
 Associational Contracts Associational Clauses (from theory) Exemplary Sources 
[demand or contingency driven]  
 
Regulating decision-making and lock-in 
resources for this procedure  
1. autonomy to decide on activities/goals and performance targets  
2. veto rights    
3. force majeure 
4. price adjustment 
5. change processes 
6. uncertainty (environmental) 
7. compelling reason clauses 
Mouzas and Blois (2013); Mallewigt et al. (2012); 
Buuren et al. (2009); Mayer and Bercovitz (2008); 
Argyres and Mayer (2007); Furlotti (2007); 
Hagedoorn and Hesen (2007); Carson et al. 
(2006); Grandori and Furlotti (2006); Smith (2006); 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003); Luo (2002); 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997)  
 
Table 1: Categories of clauses in each type of contract  
 
41 
 
 
Independent variable = Four point fuzzy coding scale (0, 0.33, 0.67, 1) according to Ragin (2008: 31)   
There were subsets in each set of clauses (subsets defined in Table 2). The information for the subsets came 
from contracting studies 
4 subsets of classical clauses,  
5 subsets of relational clauses and  
7 subsets of associational clauses coded  
 
Score  Code according to 
membership  
Classical Relational Associational 
1 No such clauses in the 
contract  
0 = full non-membership 0 out of 4 0 out of 5 0 out of 7 
2 Less than half of the 
clauses in the contract  
0.33 = mostly out 1 out of 4 1 out of 5 1-2 out of 7 
3 About half the clauses in 
the contract 
0.50 = crossover point-
ambiguous  
2 out of 4 2-3 out of 5 3-4 out of 7 
4 These clauses are most 
frequent  
0.67 = mostly in 3 out of 4 4 out of 5 5-6 out of 7 
5 All of the clauses present 
in the contract  
1 = full membership 4 out of 4 5 out of 5  7 out of 7  
 
Dependent variable—three point scale (0 = low operational performance, 1 = high operational performance) 
with the inclusion of a cut-off ambiguous point of 0.50 to accommodate mixed results according to Ragin (2008: 
31)—the information came from the interviews  
 
 Rank Definition agreed with respondent Code according to 
membership  
i Low performance 
or not successful 
(LOP) 
Parts of the contract were not fulfilled 
(time, cost or spec) with time or cost loss 
or the contract needed major changes 
and renegotiation 
0 = full non-membership 
Ii Vague situation 
(mixed) 
Several problems and some 
renegotiations in relation to any of the 
three performance criteria, but which did 
not lead to complete rewrite or collapse 
0.50 = crossover point-
ambiguous  
iii Highly successful 
(HOP) 
Few or no problems, no changes in 
terms of cost, time or scope or 
renegotiations needed in the contract 
1 = full membership 
  
 
Table 2: Fuzzy scores   
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Contract clauses  Project types 𝒙 St. Dev F-test (Levene) Sign  t-values Sig (2-tailed) 
Classical HR 0.32 0.22 0.19 0.67 -1.34 0.19 
O 0.41 0.22 -1.34 0.19 
Relational  HR 0.60 0.18 1.59 0.21 -0.42 0.68 
O 0.62 0.14 -0.44 0.66 
Associational  HR 0.52 0.30 0.75 0.39 0.85 0.40 
O 0.45 0.27 0.86 0.40 
Operational 
performance 
HR 0.56 0.25 0.25 0.62 0.90 0.37 
O 0.49 0.26 0.89 0.38 
Mean difference test for project types, disaster relief-based projects (HR) & others (O) 
 
Table 3: Checking the case sample for heterogeneity 
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Contract types/clauses Calibration 
thresholds 
𝑥    St. Dev Min. Max.  Skew. Kurt. C R A OP 
Classical (C) 2.5, 3.5, 4.5 0.36 0.22 0.16 0.83 0.22 -1.41 1    
Relational (R) 1.5, 2.5, 3.5 0.61 0.16 0.16 0.83 0.16  0.53 -0.41 1   
Associational (A) 2.5, 3.5, 4.5 0.49 0.29 0.06 0.83 0.28 -1.66 -0.73 0.52 1  
Operational performance (OP) 0.25, 0.75, 1 0.53 0.25 0.16 0.75 0.25 -1.62 -0.83 0.63 0.80 1 
            
 𝑥 (mean); St. Dev (standard deviation); all correlations are significant at p < 0.01 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
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Necessity results and models Incl. RoN Cov.r Models and hypothesis support C  R  A  
1 ~classical                                  0.98  0.76  0.82 H1 not supported (model 1) Θ - - 
2 RELATIONAL                            0.91  0.75   0.79 H2 supported (model 2) - ● - 
3 ASSOCIATIONAL 0.84   0.93  0.92 H2 supported (model 3) - - ● 
4 ~classical*RELATIONAL                0.90   0.87 0.88 H1 not supported (model 4) Θ ● - 
5 ~classical*ASSOCIATIONAL              0.84  0.94 0.93 H1 not supported (model 5) Θ - ● 
6 RELATIONAL*ASSOCIATIONAL              0.79   0.97  0.96 H2 supported (model 6)  - θ θ 
7 ~classical*RELATIONAL*ASSOCIATIONAL  0.79  0.97 0.96 H1 not supported, H2 supported (model 7) Θ θ θ 
Sufficiency results, models and solutions Incl. PRI COVS     
Complex (C), intermediate (I), Parsimonious (P)        
1 (C) ~classical*RELATIONAL*ASSOCIATIONAL 0.96 0.92 0.79 H1 not supported, H2 supported  Θ θ θ 
2 (I) ASSOCIATIONAL              0.92 0.85 0.84  - - ● 
3 (P) RELATIONAL*ASSOCIATIONAL              0.96 0.92 0.79 H2 supported  - θ θ 
      
 
Table reading keys: Classical = C; Relational = R; Associational = A 
Θ/~/ lower-case letters = Variables absent; ●/ upper-case letters = Variables present; θ = Variables moderating 
 
Table 5: QCA analysis, models, and hypotheses results 
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Variables β t-values p-values Tolerance VIF Hypotheses 
Classical (C) - 0.50 - 5.16 0.000 0.46 2.16 H1 
Relational (R) 0.27 3.52 0.001 0.73 1.37 H2 
Associational (A) 0.29 2.81 0.008 0.41 2.44 H2 
C*R -0.65 -5.90 0.000 0.88 1.14 H1 
C*R*A - 0.24 - 2.10 0.042 0.64 1.56 H1 
A*R 0.60 8.89 0.000 0.62 1.54 H2 
       
Table 6: Regression results.  
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Figure 1: The analysis steps — combining fsQCA and multiple regression/simulation tests (the 
authors) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross validate the results  
Specify research questions and 
hypotheses/propositions 
Identify cases  
Calibrate sets – 
indirect method 
Specify conditions and 
outcome sets  
Review initial stats and 
corr. data  
Construct and analyse the truth table 
Specify necessary 
conditions 
Specify sufficient 
configurations: complex, 
intermediary and 
Regression Simulation 
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Appendix 1  
Comparing the differences between contract structures (from review) Sources: 
Grandori (2006 and 2010); Grandori and Furlotti (2006; 2009a and 2009b) 
 
Contract 
type 
Fundamental principle Focus of clauses Type of partnership 
(suitable for) 
Classical 
Contracts 
safeguard and formal 
control  
 
substantive agreements  
formal, court-enforceable 
Transaction  
Allocate decision rights over task 
selection and control rights over task 
execution on predicted circumstances 
assigned to one central agent  
Highly prescriptive (transactional) 
Short, discrete, non-
repeatable  
Relational 
Contracts  
Establish a relation of 
recognition and respect  
 
substantive agreements  
informal, ‘self-enforceable’ 
Relationship  
Use informal control through extra-
contractual means to repair some of 
the failures of classical contracting  
Transactional  
Long-term relations,, 
moderately uncertain, 
repeated transactions 
Associationa
l Contracts  
Ensure action in 
contingencies  
 
procedural agreements  
formal, court-enforceable  
Decision  
Regulate discretion of action, resource 
lock-in 
Allocate decision-making among 
multiple parties  
Procedural  
Long-term relations, 
highly uncertain, 
transactions change 
over time 
Comparing contract types and structures  
 
 Associational Relational 
Structure 
of the 
contract  
A ‘core’ and a ‘belt’ 
1. Core: a constitution of 
associational clauses 
2. Belt: a mix of classical and 
relational clauses, relation- and 
partner-specific.  
Two dimensions:  
1. intended terms of trade and promised actions – 
written dimension with clauses about the exchange 
and collaborative/ communication activities 
2. Extra-contractual mechanisms – informal and 
unwritten dimension to supplement the written 
contract such as trust, authority or norms.  
Clauses High-order, content-free, framing  
decision rights and resource lock-in  
General principles and codes of conduct that should 
inspire behaviors (good faith, due diligence, non-
competition) rules for conflict resolution (negotiation, type 
of mediation, and arbitration)  
More detailed comparison between relational and associational contracts  
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Explanation of Appendix 1:  
A classical contract [named after classical economics or Transaction Cost 
Economics] establishes the rules for a discrete and simple, short, one-off 
transaction. Classical contracts safeguard from predicted risks by assigning 
rights over task selection and control rights over task execution assigned to 
one central agent (Grandori, 2010: 153). Classical contracts do not take into 
account the issues of bounded rationality, asymmetric information, or 
imbalance of power (Kimel, 2007). Eisenberg (2000: 818), proposed that 
“discrete [another word for classical] contracts are almost non-existent’ and 
“are almost as imaginary as unicorns”, suitable for exchanges that “are of very 
short duration and entailed little in the way of a relationship”.  
 
A relational contract “establishes a relation of recognition and respect” 
among partners (Markovits, 2004: 1417) and includes clauses to support the 
relationship but also complements the clauses with extra-contract means (e.g., 
trust, authority or norms Eisenberg (2000: 818)). The explicit clauses in the 
contract are just an outline; it is the implicit norms that determine the behavior 
of and exchange between the parties (Kimel, 2007: 236).  
 
In order to coordinate action under uncertainty, associational contracts set 
a constitutional frame that defines decision rights and procedures and lock in 
resources for decision-making. A set of high-order, content-free, framing 
clauses functions as the constitution that governs the process of adjusting the 
transaction terms over time (Grandori, 2010: 359; Grandori and Furlotti, 2009: 
86). This is a shift from the clauses pertaining to actions and behavior in 
transactional (classical and relational) contracts. Associational contracts are 
“the opposites of transactional (classical and relational) contracts (Grandori, 
2005), as they are procedural and establish an association rather than regulate 
an exchange” (Grandori and Furlotti, 2009a: 85). 
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Appendix 2  
Interview questions – Our interviews started with questions focused on the 
interviewees’ backgrounds, before going deeper into the project stories. The table 
below outlines the key interview questions to which the interviewers responded (the 
structured part of the semi-structured interviews). 
 
 
, 
Exemplary key questions                                            Prompters / issues discussed                                  
What were the specifics of the bidding phase?  This question investigates in more detail the raising 
capital or bidding phase as experienced by all 
parties.  
How did you divide the work amongst the contracting 
partners?  
Coordination between partners  
Please describe the contracting process with the other 
partners—types of clauses and how they have been used 
Coordinating the contract writing process  
What key issues did you find significant during the 
contract writing process? Problematic clauses  
Impact on performance  in Cost, Time and/or 
Specification—also other coordination issues   
Which issues were more prominent during the execution 
phase?  
Impact on performance in Cost, Time and/or 
Specification—also other coordination issues 
How did you deal with hindrances, obstacles or changes in 
the pre-bidding contracting and execution phases?  
Overcome problems and the effects of contractual 
clauses  
How do you think these issues could have been prevented?  Would this require a different type of clause or 
contract type?  
How did the agreements provide for communication and 
collaboration amongst the partners?  
Were there instances in which this was not enough? 
Clause specific question  
How did the agreements provide for allocation of 
resources? 
Asking for clauses which helped to coordinate and 
share responsibilities/resources  across partnering 
organizations  
How did the agreements provide for dealing with changes 
in plans?  
Understanding flexibility to changes in the 
relationship; how changes in the relationship are 
reflected in the contract 
How did the agreement provide for insubordination or lack 
of participation?  
Discussion of (dis-)incentives for partner behaviors  
What are the current operations and performance 
outcomes and measures for this project? 
Have there been any changes in these performance 
measures over the project life cycle? On time 
measures for bid/contract negotiation and build 
phase; budget measures for overall project  
Do you think that a different contract would not have had 
these issues or would you need something different in a 
contract?  
Which parts of the contract did you view as being 
the most difficult to deal with (during negotiation, 
management)? ; What kind of rewrite do you think it 
would need – none, minor or major? 
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Appendix 3 
Data Collection Table: details about each project, length, type, number of partners, number of interviews, length of interviews, number of 
interviewers in each interview, interviewee details.  
Projects                        Performance bundling Contract 
length 
(years) 
Contract type 
and value  
Value in 
millions (€ for 
1-18 and 
remaining in £) 
Partner
s  
Partners 
interviewed 
Nu of 
interviewers in 
each interview 
Nu of 
interviewees 
in each 
interview 
Nu of interviews + titles Total time last 
1. EARSS 1 Concurrent national project   8 Relational 
memorandum 
of agreement 
 
Funding 
information not 
available 
3 2 1 1 2 (project manager and 
public health civil service) 
4 hours 
2 hours 
2. EARSS 2 Concurrent national project   8 3 1 1 1 1 (project manager) 3 hours  
3. EARSS 3 Concurrent national project   8 3 1 1 1 1 (project manager) 1,5 hour 
4. IST GALEN  Open Source  ontology 
development  
2 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing  
 
3.39 8 2 1 1 2 (project manager and 1 
contractor) 
2 hours 
2 hours 
5. IST ODIN  On-
demand intranet 
for nurse 
education 
European nursing informatics and 
telematics  
2 PBC  CSC - Cost-
sharing  
€ 91.000 
0.90 6 1 1 1 1 (medical partner and 
coordinator) 
45 minutes 
6. IST TELECARE  Patient Telemonitoring  
Vital Signs Sensors over Mobile 
Networks  
4 PBC    
 
3.20 9 2 1 1 2 (project coordinator + 
medical partner) 
1,5 hour 
7. IST PROMPT  Peripheral Regions Oriented 
Measure  
3 PBC         0.50 5 1 1 1 1 (project coordinator) 1,45 hour 
8. IST M2DM  Multi-Access Telematic 
Management of Diabetes  
4 PBC         2.10 6 1 1 1 1 (project coordinator) 50  
9. eTEN AIDMAN  Feasibility study protocol models, 
effectiveness and performance for 
deployment  
2 OBC          0.73 4 1 1 1 1 (project manager and 
technical developer) 
Minute 
10. eTEN 
EURODONOR  
European Organ Data Exchange 
Portal Data Base  
2 OBC           3.19 5 2 1 1 2 (project coordinator + 
medical partner) 
1 hour 
11. eTEN EVITAL  Validate the European market for 
remote monitoring service  
3 OBC           2.13 4 1 1 1 1 (project coordinator) 45 minutes 
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12. eTEN 
MEDASHIP  
Medical consultation Assistance for 
ships  
2 OBC           2.73 5 1 1 1 1 (project coordinator) 2 hours 
13. eTEN 
MEDCONTI-
NET 
Analyze market demand for a 
Home Care system in cross-national 
context  
2 OBC           2.63 6 2 1 1 2 (project coordinator+ 
ICT 
researcher/developer) 
2 hours 
14. eTEN IREMMA  Establish a trans-European 
network, for environmental 
diseases, Asthma Allergy  
3 OBC           1.82 5 2 1 1 2 (project coordinator+ 
one partner -medial) 
1 hour 
15. eTEN TELE-
REMEDY  
feasibility study, commercial 
validation and large-scale 
deployment  
2 OBC           3.20 6 2 1 1 2 (project coordinator 
and ICT developer) 
1 hour  
16. eTEN 
MEDICATE  
Medical Diagnosis, 
Communications and Analysis 
Throughout Europe for monitor  
own asthma patients  
2 OBC,  3.67 5 2 1 1 2 (project coordinator + 
one supplier) 
50 minutes 
17. eTEN NIVEMES  Develop an international network 
of Telemedicine providers and 
services  
3 OBC           3.00 5 2 1 1 2 (project coordinator + 
one practitioner supplier) 
2 hours 
18. Hospital A  Design, build, finance and operate 
(DBFO); construction of new 
hospital; hard and soft service FM  
30 Classical - Non-
standard  
150 2 2 2 1 28 (various, project 
managers, administrators 
and supply partners) 
40.8h 
19. Hospital B  30 Classical - 
Standard 
(version 3)  
150 2 2 2 1 14 (various, project 
managers, administrators 
and supply partners) 
19.7h  
20. NGO 1  Providing medical care in a timely 
fashion, supplies quality, cost 
efficiency aspects, offering services 
to more deserving (affected) 
people using market surveys, 
inspecting sites and conducting 
case studies. NGOs provided more 
front line services, directly dealing 
with patients and affected people, 
providing many healthcare services 
5 Associational 
clauses 
 
5 3 1 (NGO) 1 1 1 (project manager) 2 hours 
21. NGO-G 2 6 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing  
10 4 1 (G) 1 1 1 (operations manager) 1 hour 
22. NGO-G 3 8 OBC  3 3 2 (both) 2 2 2 (logistics manager and 
government officer) 
4 hours 
23. NGO-G 4 7 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing 
15 4 1 (G) 1 1 1 (project director) 2.5 hours 
24. NGO-G 5 10 OBC  4 3 1(NGO) 1 1 1 (country director) 1 hour 
25. NGO-G 6 6 OBC  4 4 1 1 1 1 (project director) 1.5 hours 
26. NGO-G 7 17 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing  
12 6 1 1 1 1 (project director) 2 hours 
27. NGO-G 8 8 Relational 
memorandum 
2 4 1 1 1 1 (operations manager) 1 hour 
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of agreement   
28. NGO-G 9 10 OBC  6 5 1 1 1 1 (logistics manager) 1.2 hour 
29. NGO-G 10 20 Relational 
memorandum 
of agreement    
10 6 2 (both) 2 2 2 (project coordinator) 2.8 hour 
30. Supplier-NGO 1 These organizations (private 
suppliers and NGOs) are involved in 
joint collaboration with suppliers. 
Their performance bundles 
encompass timely deliveries to 
NGOs, central distribution hubs and 
local warehouses. Logistics 
performance indicators (e.g., 
service quality) between different 
parts of supply chains, quality of 
product and cost efficiency were 
main performance measures 
6 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing  
15 7 1 (S) 1 1 1 (director, owner) 1 hour 
31. Supplier-NGO 2 5 OBC  5 3 1 (NGO) 1 1 1(project director) 1.10 hour 
32. Supplier-NGO 3 11 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing  
18 4 1 (S) 1 1 1 (supply chain manager) 1 hour 
33. Supplier-NGO 4 13 OBC  7 3 1 (S) 1 1 1 (Logistics and 
distribution manager) 
1.4 hour 
34. Supplier-NGO 5 12 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing  
9 4 1 (S) 1 1 1 (director) 1 hour 
35. Supplier-NGO 6 18 Relational 
memorandum 
of agreement    
4 3 1 (NGO) 1 1 1 (project coordinator) 1 hour 
36. Supplier-NGO 7 21 Relational 
memorandum 
of agreement    
11 5 2 (both) 2 2 2 (country director and 
government officer) 
4.5 hours 
37. Supplier-NGO 8 14 Relational 
memorandum 
of agreement    
10.50 6 1 (NGO) 1 1 
 
1 (country director) 1.9 hours 
38. Supplier-NGO 9 13 Relational 
clauses 
 
8 3 1 (NGO) 1 1 1 (project director) 2 hours 
39. Supplier-NGO 
10 
10 Relational  
memorandum 
of agreements    
 
15 4 1 (S) 1 1 1 (director) 2.5 hours 
40. Supplier-NGO 
11 
9 OBC  4 4 1 (S) 1 1 1 (supply chain manager) 1.5 hours 
41. Hospital-NGO 1 Hospitals and NGOs work together 
to provide mass-scale services, 
including emergency operations 
and surgeries required for people 
affected by disasters (e.g., 
earthquakes).  Time, cost, 
preferences for most affected 
people, and service quality were 
9 Relational and 
association 
memorandum 
of agreements    
 
15 6 1 (H) 1 1 1 (doctor) 2.2 hours 
42. Hospital-NGO 2  6 OBC  2.50 3 1 (H) 1 1 1 (doctor) 2.6 hours 
43. Hospital-NGO 3 10 PBC CSC - Cost-
sharing  
12 5 2 (both) 2 2 2 (doctor and country 
directory) 
5.5 hours 
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44. Hospital-NGO 4 the key performance indicators, 
which were part of their contracts 
14 OBC  11 3 1 (NGO) 1 1 1 (project director) 2.9 hours 
45. Hospital-NGO 5 8 Relational 
memorandum 
of agreement    
4.50 3 1 (NGO) 1 1 1 (operations manager) 2.4 hours 
55 
 
Authors: 
 
 
 
Maria Kapsali 
Lecturer in Management Systems (Projects & Operations)  
Management Systems & Logistics 
Faculty of Business, Law and Politics  
Hull University Business School  
M.Kapsali@hull.ac.uk 
+0044 (0)1482 34 7598   
                                                              https://www.linkedin.com/in/mariakapsali/  
 
 
Maria Kapsali has conducted research for more than 10 years in the management of innovative 
and creative projects-operations at Manchester Business School (OPTIMA = Operations, Technology 
and Innovation Management), at Imperial College Business School (Innovation & Entrepreneurship 
group; HaCIRIC = Health and Care Infrastructure Research and Innovation Centre), at the University of 
Umeå, Sweden (Project and Innovation Networks group) and at the University of Hull (Management 
Systems and Logistics group). The results of her work are two books, four published scientific articles, 
four book chapters and several other contributions. Maria’s work is published in Technovation, 
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, the International Journal of Project Management, the 
Scandinavian Journal of Management and by Palgrave/Macmillan and Edward Elgar.  
 
 
 
                                                      Jens Roehrich 
HPC Supply Chain Innovation Lab  
Information, Decisions and Operations Division      
School of Management  
University of Bath BA2 7AY 
United Kingdom 
 
 
Jens Roehrich is the HPC Chair in Supply Chain Innovation at the School of Management, 
University of Bath, UK. Before joining the University of Bath, Jens worked at Imperial College Business 
School, Imperial College London, UK. Significant strands of his research agenda explore the long-term 
interplay of contractual and relational exchange governance mechanisms and the management of 
public-private collaborations in the UK and across Europe. His research has been published in journals 
such as International Journal of Operations and Production Management, Journal of Management 
Studies, British Journal of Management, and Social Science & Medicine. 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
Pervaiz Akhtar 
Management Systems & Logistics 
Faculty of Business, Law and Politics  
Hull University Business School, UK 
IESEG School of Management, France 
Abasyn University, Pakistan 
  https://www.linkedin.com/in/pervaiz-akhtar-7175054b/ 
 
Pervaiz Akhtar is Full Professor (Chair) of Management Systems and Director of BSc Logistics & 
SCM at University of Hull, UK. He holds Visiting Professorships in Big Data and Analytics/Management 
Science, IESEG (France) and Abasyn University (Pakistan). He is a Member of Academic Executive 
Council and has served as Director for multiple Programmes. Capitalising on over 15 years of 
academic and industrial experience, his areas of expertise encompass Business Analytics, Data Science, 
Information Systems, Innovative Research Methods/Techniques, Logistics, Transportation and 
Operations to Supply Chain Planning and Control. His research has appeared in leading journals. He 
can be contacted at pervaiz_khan972@hotmail.com. 
 
